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1    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS








On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 93-cr-0084)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 19, 2009
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: June 10, 2009)
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Percy Dillon appeals the District Court’s partial denial of his motion to reduce his
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  In 2008, the United States Sentencing
 This Guidelines Range includes the mandatory consecutive 60-month sentence1
for the firearms offense.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
2
Commission amended the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”),
retroactively reducing the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses.  The District
Court subsequently entered an order reducing Dillon’s sentence by two-levels, but held
that it lacked authority to reduce Dillon’s sentence further.  Dillon argues that the District
Court erred in failing to recognize that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) gave
it such authority.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
If Booker did apply in proceedings pursuant to § 3582, Dillon would likely be an
ideal candidate for a non-Guidelines sentence.  In 1993, Dillon was convicted of
conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; use of a firearm during a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and possession with intent to distribute more
than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  
At the time, the District Court calculated Dillon’s offense level to be 38 and his
criminal history category to be II.  Dillon received two criminal history points; one for
misdemeanor marijuana possession and one for misdemeanor resisting arrest.  Thus,
Dillon’s Guidelines Range was 322 to 387 months.1
The District Court sentenced Dillon to the bottom of the Guidelines Range, 322
3months.  However, the District Court repeatedly stated that it was constrained by the
Guidelines to impose what it believed to be an unreasonable sentence.  At Dillon’s
original sentencing hearing, the District Court noted: “I personally don’t believe that you
should be serving 322 months[, b]ut I feel I am bound by those Guidelines . . .”  App. at
99.  The District Court continued: “I don’t say to you that these penalties are fair.  I don’t
think they are fair.  I think they are entirely too high for the crime you have committed
even though it is a serious crime.”  Id.  The District Court also noted that it believed
Dillon’s sentence to be unreasonable in its Statement of Reasons: “[T]he guidelines range
is unfair to the defendant.  The Court, however, is bound by the guidelines range.”  App.
at 5.  
Following the change in the crack cocaine offense level, Dillon filed a pro se
motion for a sentence reduction.  The District Court recalculated Dillon’s offense level to
be 36 and reduced Dillon’s sentence to 270 months.  Dillon argued that the District Court
should apply Booker in resentencing him, but the District Court found that Booker did not
apply and that it lacked jurisdiction to do grant more than a 2-level sentence reduction.  
II.
A court generally may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has become
final.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  However, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that:
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994( o) . . .
the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors
4set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury
to find the facts that establish a mandatory floor on a defendant’s sentence.  543 U.S. at
229, 244.  Following Booker, a sentencing court must calculate a defendant’s Guidelines
range, but may only use that range as a starting point for determining a reasonable
sentence based on an individualized assessment of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).  Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596-97 (2007).  Dillon argues that a district
court adjusting a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c) must also treat the amended Guidelines
range as advisory, and impose a sentence based on the procedures set forth in the Booker
line of cases.  
We have held that Booker does not effect eligibility for a § 3582(c) sentence
reduction.  See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that
defendants’ who received substantial assistance departures below the statutory mandatory
minimum were not eligible for reduction); United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d
Cir. 2009) (holding that defendant sentenced based on career offender Guidelines Range
was not eligible for reduction as a result of the crack cocaine amendment).  
Though, we have not yet written precedentially on whether Booker gives a district
court authority to give a defendant who is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582
an additional reduction, our reasoning in the eligibility cases also applies in this context. 
5In the context of eligibility for a § 3582 sentence reduction we explained that:
Nowhere in Booker did the Supreme Court mention § 3582(c)(2).
Because § 3582(c)(2) proceedings may only reduce a defendant’s sentence
and not increase it, the constitutional holding in Booker does not apply to §
3582(c)(2).  See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.  Additionally, the remedial
holding in Booker invalidated only 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory for full sentencings, and § 3742(e), which
directed appellate courts to apply a de novo standard of review to departures
from the Guidelines.  Therefore, Booker applies to full sentencing
hearings–whether in an initial sentencing or in a resentencing where the
original sentence is vacated for error, but not to sentence modification
proceedings under § 3582(c)(2).  Not only are sentence modification
proceedings sanctioned under a different section of the statute than those at
issue in Booker, but the Booker court held that “[w]ith these two sections
excised (and statutory cross-references to the two sections consequently
invalidated), the remainder of the Act satisfies the Court's constitutional
requirements.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.  Section 3582(c)(2) contains no
cross-reference to § 3553(b) and therefore was not affected by Booker.  Nor
is there anything else in Booker that directly addresses § 3582(c)
proceedings. 
. . . .
Nothing in Booker purported to obviate the congressional directive
in § 3582(c)(2) that a sentence reduction pursuant to that section be
consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.  The language of
§ 3582(c)(2) could not be clearer: the statute predicates authority to reduce
a defendant’s sentence on consistenc[y] with the policy statement, and the
policy statement provides that a reduction is not consistent if the
amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
Guideline range.  The Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but that does not
render optional statutory directives.
. . . .
Because U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 is binding on the District Court pursuant
to § 3582(c)(2), the District Court correctly concluded that it lacked the
authority to further reduce the Appellants’ sentences. 
Doe, 564 F.3d at 312-14 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  For the same
6reasons, we conclude that Booker does not apply to the size of a sentence reduction that
may be granted under § 3582(c)(2).  
In doing so, we are joined by the overwhelming majority of our sister Courts of
Appeals.  See United States v. Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Booker
does not apply); United States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (same);
United States v. Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v.
Starks, 551 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833,
840 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2009)
(same); United States v. Savoy, —F.3d—, 2009 WL 1457976, *2 (2d Cir. 2009), but see
United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Booker abolished the
mandatory nature of the Guidelines in all contexts).
Dillon also argues that the District Court erred in calculating his criminal history
score.  However, the District Court had no authority to reconsider its prior criminal
history determination.  See, e.g., Mateo, 560 F.3d at 156.
III.
Because Booker does not apply in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, the District Court did
not err in denying Dillon’s motion for a reduction below his new Guidelines Range.  We
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
